In this paper, we construct a vertical differentiation model comprising an upstream manufacturer and two downstream retailers with cost asymmetry. In this model, the manufacturer not only produces a physical product it sells to the downstream retailers, but also has an option of "versioning" to open a new direct channel for an alternate digital product. We find that the direct digital channel may reduce the quantity of the physical product sold by the inefficient retailer even if it increases total quantity. It may also increase the quantity of the physical product sold by the efficient retailer even if it reduces total quantity. Cost asymmetry across the retailers plays a role in these results. Moreover, under certain conditions related to the manufacturer's cost and if the quality of the digital product is sufficiently low, then the manufacturer raises the wholesale price of the physical product and ceases to deal with the inefficient retailer, thereby eliminating retail competition, which may raise its retail price. This lowers the welfare of consumers who continue to purchase the physical product after the new digital product comes onto the market.
Introduction
The emergence of a new marketing channel affects the economy by expanding the consumer's choice of products, altering the competitiveness of retail markets and affecting manufacturers' profitability positively or negatively depending on the market structure. The emerging electronic commerce (e-commerce) channel, which operates through the Internet, constitutes a typical marketing channel with these features. Since its development in the second half of the 1990s, e-commerce has grown rapidly.
According to Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), in 2011, the size of Japanese businesses to consumer e-commerce market is about 8.5 trillion yen (METI, 2012) . With an increased volume of transactions and a greater variety of items traded, today's market is 8.6 percentage points larger than in 2010, and is 5.7 times larger than it was in 2001. In addition to ordinary retail sales, this figure includes sales of services such as hotel and restaurant reservations made over the Web and fees for Internet banking. The size of the retail and services market through e-commerce in 2011 was 12.2% higher than in the year before, at about 5.9 trillion yen. General merchandise retailing accounted for the largest share of retail and services e-commerce market (21.1% in 2011). However, the percentage of e-commerce market in total market, including traditional retailing, remains small. METI (2012) reports that, in 2011, e-commerce accounted for 2.83% of total retail and services market and 4.74% of general merchandise retailing. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the potential economic impact of e-commerce is enormous.
In particular, the downloading of digital products directly from the Web has recently attracted attention because this practice has fundamentally transformed the content of businesses in such industries as music, publishing and software. According to the Recording Industry Association of Japan (RIAJ, 2012), Japanese music market has declined significantly in recent years. Annual sales of physical products such as music CDs and DVDs peaked at about 607 billion yen in 1998 and have since declined steadily, falling to about 282 billion yen in 2011. Although digital products such as music ringtones for cell phones and downloadable music from the Web have become important for the music industry, the market for content for mobile devices has declined in recent years after peaking at about 79.9 billion yen in 2008. By contrast, the market for digital music downloaded from the Web has continued to grow since the early 2000s; despite a slight decline in 2010, sales in 2011 amounted to 12.6 billion yen, which is about 6.8 times the 2005 figure.
Taking the above economic background into account, in this paper we examine the impact of a digital product on the market for a physical product with a vertical differentiation model 1 Mussa and Rosen (1978) is a useful model to analyze the competition of firms producing goods which has the difference of quality. This model has been often used and been extended in various directions for the subject of research in the literature of industrial organization and marketing science. See Avenel and Caprice (2006) and Toshimitsu (2008) , for example. Price competition among firms is often assumed in the model, while there are papers in which quantity competition is used. Motta (1993) , and Toshimitsu and Jinji (2007) derive equilibria of both price and quantity competition, and compare the two. Bacchiega, Randon and Zirulia (2012) is a recent example using the model. 2 Belleflamme (2005) provides a unified framework to examine versioning strategies used in the information economy. Functional degradation analyzed in Csorba and Hahn (2006) is the theme related with this paper, although there is no network effect in our model. See also Deneckere and McAfee (1996) . They show that a monopoly manufacturer can increase their profit by intentionally damaging a high-quality product to produce a low-quality counterpart even if the marginal cost of the latter is higher than that of the former. 3 The horizontal differentiation approachà la Hotelling (1929) has also been used in the literature of industrial organization and marketing science. See Matsushima (2004) , Coughlan and Soberman (2005) , and Ishibashi and Matsushima (2009) for example. Recent researches on e-commerce using this approach include Nakayama (2009), Yoo and Lee (2011) , and Vernik, Purohit and Desai (2011).
through two channels. The direct channel reduces the perceived quality of the product from one to θ, because consumers cannot examine the product before buying it. In addition, they impose a restriction on the manufacturer's pricing such that w ≤ p d . They do so to prevent the retailers from having an incentive to buy the product through the direct channel at the price p d instead of buying it at the wholesale price w. They show that opening a direct marketing channel enhances retail competitiveness, even if nothing is sold through this channel, and makes conventional retailers place more orders, which benefits the manufacturer. They also show that the profits of both the manufacturer and retailers increase after the direct channel opens if θ falls in some range. 4 By contrast, we consider a situation in which product r, which is sold through the retail channel, is physically different from product d, which is sold through the direct digital channel via the Internet. For example, a computer software package in the form of a physical medium such as a CD-ROM is sold through the retail channel, and the same digital content is sold through the direct digital channel. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a vertical differentiation model that incorporates the features described above. Having first examined the equilibrium of a model that does not incorporate a direct digital channel, we derive the equilibrium of a model that does incorporate such a channel. In Section 3, we compare the equilibria derived in the previous section, focusing on the retail quantity and price. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. All proofs of lemmas and propositions are in the Appendix at the end of this paper.
Model
In this section, we first examine a model that does not incorporate a direct digital channel. Then, having examined one that incorporates such a channel, we compare the two models.
Model without a Direct Digital Channel
Consider a game played by a manufacturer and two retailers. The game proceeds as follows. First, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price w. Then, the retailers simultaneously choose their quantities (q H , q L ) given w. Consumers then decide whether to buy the product given the retail price p r . We analyze this game and derive its subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Consumers
Consumer v's surplus from product r is
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the product. If consumer v φ1 is indifferent between buying product r and not buying it, then v φ1 satisfies
Consumers whose marginal quality evaluation is at least v φ1 purchase product r. Thus, the demand for product r is
Retailers
Retailer i (= H, L) chooses quantity q i to maximize profit given the other retailer's quantity q j ( j = i) and the wholesale price, w, set by the manufacturer. Inverting (3) yields
By using (4) and the market-clearing condition, D r = q H + q L , we obtain the profit of
Retailer i as follows:
under the condition that 1−q j > 0. This condition means that Retailer j does not completely satisfy consumer demand. Maximizing (5) with respect to q i gives
The following lemma shows the equilibrium quantities given w:
In the subgame of retail competition in the absence of a direct digital channel, the equilibrium quantities given w are
Total quantity in the retail market,
This lemma indicates that Retailer H's quantity is zero when w exceeds 1 + c L − 2c H . In addition, (8) has a kink at w = 1 + c L − 2c H ; we also have
Manufacturer
The manufacturer chooses wholesale price w to maximize profit, taking (8) into account. The profit of the manufacturer is
where c r is the marginal cost of producing product r. There may exist two local maxima in (9) given the kink in Q r at w = 1 + c L − 2c H . We must take this into account when we consider the manufacturer's maximization. The following lemma shows the profit-maximizing wholesale price set by the manufacturer when there is no direct channel:
Lemma 2
In the game in which there is no direct digital channel, the wholesale price w that maximizes the manufacturer's profit (9) is
, then the wholesale price set by the manufacturer is low enough for the two retailers to be able to purchase the product. Otherwise, the high-cost retailer (i.e., Retailer H) cannot procure the product because the wholesale price is too high.
maximize the manufacturer's profit. That is, in this case, it is optimal for the manufacturer to sell to both retailers or to sell to only the low-cost retailer.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the case in which both retailers are active. We assume that the following condition is satisfied: 
Model with a Direct Digital Channel
We add a direct digital marketing channel to the model and analyze a new game played by the manufacturer and the two retailers. This game proceeds as follows. First, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price w and the direct-channel price p d . Then, the retailers simultaneously choose their quantities given w and p d . Given p r and p d , consumers then make their purchasing decisions. We analyze this game and derive its subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Consumers
Consumer v's surplus from product d is
The surplus from product r is given by (1) . Each consumer has three choices: (a) to buy product r; (b) to buy product d; or (c) to buy neither product. If consumer v is indifferent between buying product r and buying product d, then v satisfies
is indifferent between buying product d and not buying it, then v φ2 satisfies
The demand for product r is
The demand for product d is as follows:
The following lemma shows the equilibrium quantities given w: (15) is valid under the former inequality. If either or both inequalities do not hold, then part of (15) no longer represents Retailer i's optimal quantity. However, Lemma 3 is valid because it is conditioned on p d correspondingly.
Lemma 3 In the subgame of retail competition in the presence of a direct digital channel, the equilibrium quantities given (p d , w) are as follows:
where the regions conditioning (p d , w) are defined as
The regions defined in Lemma 3 are illustrated in Figure 1 , which is based on the following parameter values:
The coordinates of points A-G in this figure are as follows: Total output in the retail market as a function of p d and w is summarized as follows: 
The corresponding summary of retail price is as follows:
Note that demand for product
Manufacturer
The manufacturer chooses the direct price p d and the wholesale price w to maximize profit. Given Q r and Q d as (18) and (20), respectively, the manufacturer's profit is
where c d is the marginal cost of producing product d. Note that (18) and (20) have different shapes depending on the region in which the pair (p d , w) lies, and that neither is differentiable with respect to the price along the border between the two regions. Thus, there may exist different local maxima in (21) . We take this into account when considering the manufacturer's maximization. However, it is difficult to solve the maximization problem without imposing conditions. Hence, to simplify our analysis, we make the following assumption:
The right-hand side of the above inequality is positive if c L < 1 and if c H is not too large relative to c L . Note that making Assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure that Assumption 1 holds. This is because the following relationship holds:
The following lemma shows the profit-maximizing price set by the manufacturer operating with a direct channel:
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, the pair of prices (direct-channel and
where the regions conditioning (c d , c r ) are defined as
. Figure 2 shows the regions defined in Lemma 4. This figure is based on the parameter values given in (17) , which were also used for Figure 1 . The coordinates of points A-G in this figure are as follows:
, then the manufacturer set the prices (p d , w) so that demand for both products is positive. When c r is small enough to be included in R 1a , a low wholesale price (w =
) is set to allow Retailers H and L to procure product r from the manufacturer. Otherwise, a high wholesale price (w =
) is set to attract only Retailer L. Note that if (c d , c r ) lies along segment AC in Figure 2 , then both wholesale prices are optimal for the manufacturer. If (c d , c r ) ∈ R 2 , then the manufacturer sets p d equal to
, which is high enough to eliminate the demand for product d. That is, consumers whose quality evaluation is v ≥ v φ2 = p d θ purchase product r and the rest purchase neither product. Note that this direct price does not depend on c d . Thus, the manufacturer maintains this direct price as long as
. Given Lemma 4, we can derive the equilibrium outcomes for the three cases as functions of the costs (c d , c r ) . We summarize the outcomes in the following proposition, in which the superscript * * denotes an equilibrium outcome from the model incorporating the direct channel: 
Equilibrium Comparison
In this section, we examine the equilibrium outcomes derived in the previous section from the models incorporating and omitting a direct digital channel. Specifically, we compare the equilibrium outcomes by focusing on the retail quantity and price, and discuss the results.
Quantity
We compare the equilibrium quantities of product r in the models with and without a direct channel by using the results of Propositions 1 and 2. First, let us consider the total quantity Q r . We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, it follows that
This proposition reveals a number of findings. First, given a c r satisfying Assumption 2, if c d is relatively large so that the pair (c d , c r ) lies in R 2 , then opening a direct digital channel for product d increases the total quantity of product r. Note that, in this case, the demand for product d is zero and the wholesale price to the retailers does not change. Next, suppose that c d takes an intermediate value so that the pair (c d , c r ) lies in R 1a . Then, opening the direct digital channel increases the total quantity of product r if and only if c r is small enough to satisfy (22) . Next, suppose that c d is small so that the pair (c d , c r ) lies in R 1b . In addition, suppose that θ > 3 − 3 2 √ 3. Then, opening the direct digital channel increases the total quantity of product r if and only if c r is small enough to satisfy (23) . If θ is large, product d is a close substitute for product r. Facing the entry of such a product, Retailer L behaves competitively and increases the quantity if c r is small. Note that, in this case, the wholesale price to the retailers increases, and as a result, Retailer H's quantity falls to zero. By contrast, if θ ≤ 3 − 3 2 √ 3, then opening the direct digital channel reduces the total quantity of product r. If θ is small, product d is a poor substitute for product r. Thus, Retailer L behaves less competitively.
Next, consider the equilibrium quantities sold by each retailer, q H and q L . From Proposition 2, in R 2 , these quantities are not uniquely determined because any combination satisfying
is an equilibrium outcome. We also know that q H = 0 in R 1b . Thus, we restrict our attention to the case in which (c d , c r ) ∈ R 1a . Hence, we obtain the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. If (c d , c r ) ∈ R 1a , then it follows that
From Propositions 3 and 4, we obtain a number of findings. If it is the case that
then opening the direct digital channel reduces the quantity sold by Retailer H even if it increases the total quantity of product r. By contrast, if it is the case that
then opening the direct digital channel increases the quantity sold by Retailer L even if it reduces the total quantity of product r. If there is no cost asymmetry between the two retailers (i.e., c H = c L ), both the total quantity and each retailer's quantity increase if and only if c r <
Thus, cost differences between retailers cause changes in total and 
Price
In this subsection, we examine how the retail price of product r changes following the opening of the direct digital channel. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, it follows that
A number of findings emerge from this proposition. Given a c r satisfying Assumption 2, if the pair (c d , c r ) lies in R 1a or R 2 , then the opening of a direct digital channel for product d unambiguously reduces the retail price of product r. This means that the introduction of product d enhances retail competition, and all consumers that purchase product r or product d obtain an additional surplus. This result also applies if the pair (c d , c r ) 
The entry of such a product leads Retailer L to behave less competitively. As a result, this new entry reduces the consumer surplus of consumers who continue to purchase product r following the introduction of product d. Figure 7 is based on the following parameter values:
The dashed line in Figure 7 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a vertical differentiation model of an upstream manufacturer and two downstream retailers with cost asymmetry. In the model, the manufacturer produces a physical product and sells it to the downstream retailers. Moreover, the manufacturer can choose to open a new direct channel for a digital product. We compared the equilibrium outcomes in the models incorporating and omitting a direct digital channel.
The results obtained in this paper are summarized as follows. Opening a direct digital channel increases or decreases the quantity of the physical product depending on the costs of the manufacturer and retailers. When the marginal cost of producing the physical product is sufficiently small, the quantity of the physical product increases following the opening of the direct digital channel. However, the direct digital channel may reduce the quantity of the physical product sold by the inefficient retailer even if it increases total quantity. Opening the direct digital channel may increase the quantity of the physical product sold by the efficient retailer even if it reduces total quantity. These results arise because of cost asymmetry between the two retailers, which is new to the literature to the author's best knowledge. Moreover, under certain conditions related to the manufacturer's costs and if the quality of the digital product is low, then an increase in the wholesale price of the physical product by the manufacturer may raise its retail price and may cause the inefficient retailer to cease trading, thereby eliminating retail competition. This lowers the welfare of consumers who continue to purchase the physical product after the new digital product comes onto the market; however, this result applies only under restrictive conditions on the model's parameters.
Finally, we conclude this paper with some qualifications. First, we assumed that the quality of the digital product is low when compared with the alternate physical product. However, through its efforts a manufacturer can improve the quality of the digital product. Consequently, the quality of the digital product can be high relative to the physical counterpart, at least for some consumers. In addition, while our models assumed that each consumer buys at most one product, some consumers may actually purchase both the physical and digital product (e.g., a paper book and an e-book). With this in mind, we should include an additional dimension in our vertical differentiation models so we can examine the effect of both quality improvements and product bundling. Second, we ignored competition between manufacturers. However, in many industries, manufacturers develop new products and compete with each other, especially where both the upstream and downstream markets are oligopolies. For example, there is acute competition between manufacturers of computers and similar digital devices. To more fully understand the impact of a new marketing channel for physical or digital products, we must then explicitly consider upstream competition.
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These are important matters that should be considered in future research.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose each retailer's quantity is positive in equilibrium. Combining the optimal quantities of Retailer i (= H, L) in the second line of (6) yields
For these quantities to be positive, the following conditions must hold:
Note that (30) is sufficient to satisfy (31). When (30) does not hold, Retailer H's optimal quantity is zero. Then, Retailer L becomes a monopolist in the retail market. The monopolist's optimal quantity is
For this quantity to be positive, the following condition must be satisfied:
Proof of Lemma 2
From (8), we find that the shape of (9) depends on w. First, suppose that w is in the range 1
It must be the case that
for (34) to locally maximize Π m around (34). The second-order condition for a local maximum is satisfied. Substituting (34) into (9) yields the locally maximized profit,
Next, suppose that w is in the range c r < w < 1 + c L − 2c H . Setting a price below c r is not profitable. Thus, we only consider this range. Differentiating Π m with respect to w
or, equivalently,
for (36) to locally maximize Π m around (36). The second-order condition for a local maximum is satisfied. Substituting (36) into (9) yields the locally maximized profit,
From (35) and (37), we find that
and the wholesale price, w, that maximizes (9) is as follows:
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 2, under Assumption 1, the wholesale price maximizing the manufacturer's profit is
By substituting (38) into (4), (7) and (8), we obtain the equilibrium retail price, each retailer's equilibrium quantity and the equilibrium total quantity in the retail market. Substituting (38), the retail price and the corresponding quantities into (5) yields the equilibrium profit of each retailer. The equilibrium profit of the manufacturer is (37).
Proof of Lemma 3
We consider separately three cases, which differ in their dependence on the level of total quantity, q H + q L . First, we consider the following case:
In this case, the direct channel generates positive demand. From the second line of (15), the best-response functions for the two retailers are as follows:
By assuming that both these quantities are positive in equilibrium, we obtain
Note that (42) is sufficient to satisfy (43). By substituting (40) and (41) into (39), we obtain
When (42) does not hold, Retailer H's optimal quantity is zero. Then, in the retail market, Retailer L becomes a monopolist, whose optimal quantity is
By substituting q H = 0 and (45) into (39), we obtain
To sum up, (40) and (41) are the equilibrium quantities under (42) and (44), and q H = 0 and (45) represent the equilibrium under (46) and (47). Next, consider the following case:
In this case, the direct channel generates no demand. From the fourth line of (15), the best-response functions for the two retailers are
Note that (51) is sufficient to satisfy (52). Substituting (49) and (50) into (48) yields
When (51) does not hold, Retailer H's optimal quantity is zero. Then, in the retail market, Retailer L becomes a monopolist, whose optimal quantity is
By substituting q H = 0 and (54) into (48), we obtain
To sum up, (49) and (50) are the equilibrium quantities under (51) and (53), and q H = 0 and (54) represent the equilibrium under (55) and (56). Next, consider the following intermediate case:
In this case, v = v φ2 . No consumer derives a positive surplus from product d. The third lines of (15) and (57) are identical in this case. Any quantities satisfying (57) represent an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4
First, suppose that (p d , w) ∈ R 3a ∪ R 3b . In these regions, p d is high enough to eliminate the direct channel demand. Thus, the (local) maximization wholesale price is the same as that described in Lemma 2. Given Assumption 2, the wholesale price that locally maximizes the manufacturer's profit is not in R 3b but in R 3a ; this wholesale price is
By substituting this price into the inequality w ≤ 3 2θ
(which is one of the conditions characterizing R 3a ), we obtain
That is, setting p d high enough to satisfy the above inequality is necessary for (58) to be in R 3a .
Second, suppose that (p d , w) ∈ R 2 . Again, in this region, the direct channel generates no demand, and the manufacturer's profit is
Thus, the manufacturer can simultaneously increase w and decrease p d as long as (p d , w) ∈ R 2 . As a result, it is sufficient to consider the pair (p d , w) along the segment
where p d and w satisfy
or along the segment
(Note that in Figure1 the direct price corresponds to segment AC, and the wholesale price corresponds to segment CE.) Consider the former case (59). The manufacturer's profit is
Differentiating (63) with respect to p d yields
Substituting (64) into (59) yields
To locally maximize (63), the above pair (p d , w) must satisfy (60) or, equivalently, must satisfy
The second-order condition for a local maximum is satisfied. Substituting (64) into (63) yields the locally maximized profit,
Consider the latter case (61). The manufacturer's profit is
Differentiating (66) with respect to p d yields
Substituting (67) into (61) yields
To locally maximize (66), the above pair (p d , w) must satisfy (62) or, equivalently, must
The second-order condition for a local maximum is satisfied. Substituting (67) into (66) yields the locally maximized profit,
From (65) and (69), we find that
Therefore,
Note that, for any θ ∈ (0, 1), 
respectively. The second-order conditions for local maximization are satisfied as follows:
where the regions conditioning (c d , c r ) are defined as follows:
which is located in R 1b . Therefore, given Assumption 2, it follows that Q * * r > Q * r if and only if c r <
